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Abstract. This paper explores how operational models and compensation methods are associated 
with bus drivers’ incentives and consequently bus service quality and safety in Bangkok. We cross-
analyze data on bus drivers’ compensation collected from a structured interview survey with data on 
passenger complaints and bus accidents compiled from governmental databases. Recognizing that 
the official statistics on bus accidents in Bangkok are undercounted, as the government includes 
only accidents with severe damages and injuries, we use passenger complaints as the proxy for safety 
levels. We find that private joint-service operators provide their drivers with far less compensation 
and benefits than the state-owned operator. The private operators also tie drivers’ compensation 
and benefit levels to the numbers of working hours and trips, especially on routes where private 
operators can compete freely. These compensation methods incentivize drivers to work long hours 
beyond what is permitted by law, inducing fatigue and potential accidents. The key policy implication 
is that the bus policy aiming to improve service quality and safety should improve drivers’ 
compensation and working conditions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Bus services in Bangkok have lost ridership substantially 
in the past two decades both in terms of  number of  
passengers and mode share [1]. This downward trend is 
expected to continue due to several confounding reasons. 
Despite increasing travel demand thanks to urban 
population growth and suburbanization, state and private 
bus operators have not been able to expand coverage due 
to limited resources, low profit margins, and the 
government’s fare-control policy [2]. By contrast, private 
vehicle ownership in Bangkok keeps rising, and the rail 
transit ridership continues to grow as the networks 
expand. These trends are expected to continue. 
In addition to inadequate coverage and frequency, low 
service quality and safety concerns could also contribute 
to the decreasing bus ridership. Even though the official 
statistics on bus accidents in Bangkok’s urban routes are 
low, i.e., only 27.7 per year between 2015 and 2017 
compared with 301.33 per year over the same period in 
interurban routes, the numbers are likely undercounted. 
(See Table 1.) The government database includes only 
accidents with severe damages and injuries. News reports 
abound with stories about rude drivers and reckless 
driving that causes accidents. Some routes are particularly 
notorious to have more accidents and to receive 
passengers’ complaints on low service quality [3, 4]. The 
problems seem particularly severe and frequent on routes 
with overlapping portions with other routes, as drivers 
tend to race for passengers.  
 
Table 1. Official Accident Statistics of Public Buses in 
Thailand (Number of Accidents with Fatalities, Serious 
Injuries, or Significant Property Damages). 
 
 
Such problems could be attributed to the ways in 
which the services are licensed and operated, and how and 
how much the drivers are paid. Although the state-run 
Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA) operate their 
buses on most major bus routes in Bangkok, private 
“joint-service” operators now cover more routes with 
more vehicles than the BMTA [5]. While the BMTA is the 
sole licensee to operate bus services, private operators are 
permitted to pick up passengers on routes where BMTA 
cannot cover. Some private operators have their own fleet 
and employ their own drivers. Others further subcontract 
individual operators to provide services on their behalf 
and share the farebox revenues [6]. Some private operators 
rent their vehicles to independent drivers on a daily basis, 
who shoulder fuel costs and sometimes maintenance costs 
and keep the fare revenue. While BMTA drivers are state 
employees who receive fixed minimum salaries and other 
benefits [7], drivers of private operators are paid 
differently [8]. A question arises as to whether operational 
models and compensation methods affect drivers’ 
incentives and behaviors and consequently the quality and 
safety of bus services. 
This paper attempts to explore the above question by 
cross-analyzing data on driver compensation collected 
from a field survey with the government’s records on 
passenger complaints and accidents. The general 
hypothesis is that the operators of different operational 
models compensate their drivers differently, which affect 
the drivers’ incentives and consequently service quality 
and safety in different degrees. After reviewing relevant 
literature in the following section, we provide an overview 
on how bus services are provided in Bangkok and on 
relevant laws that govern drivers’ behaviors and working 
hours. The following section outlines the research 
methodology and data, followed by the findings. The last 
section concludes with policy implications and suggestions 
for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Two related strands of  literature serve as the 
conceptual basis for this study: one on how operational 
models affect bus service quality and safety, and the other 
on how compensation levels and methods affect drivers’ 
behaviors. 
One common debate on bus operational models is 
whether private operators can provide better and more 
efficient services than public ones. Previous studies find 
private operators perform better than public operators in 
France [9], Spain [10], and Britain [11]. But several other 
studies have provided empirical evidence refuting that 
claim [12-15]. It is important to note that these studies are 
based on experiences in cities in developed economies. 
Urban bus services in developing-country cities, such as 
Bangkok, are quite different in that they often involve a 
large number of informal operators, and that there are 
widespread institutional problems in monitoring and 
enforcing service quality and safety standards.  
Service quality and safety issues of bus services in 
developing countries are often attributed to the hyper-
competitive nature. Operators often use substandard 
vehicles, as they have limited resources to invest in new 
vehicles and equipment and have to keep the costs low. 
On-road competition to pick up passengers also induces 
dangerous driving behaviors. Drivers usually gain income 
based on distance and work hours, and mostly without 
labor protection and insurance. Informality and hyper-
competitiveness are thus jointly the fundamental cause of 
low service quality and high safety risks of bus services in 
developing countries [16]. 
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The debate on operational models is closely related to 
the arguments for and against bus liberalization. Empirical 
evidence shows mixed results on the effects of bus 
liberalization on service quality and safety in developing 
countries. Delhi’s bus liberalization in the 1990s did 
increase the number of private buses, thus expanding the 
networks and increasing service frequency. But the service 
quality deteriorated in terms of reckless driving and the 
resulting accidents [17]. Similar problems occurred in 
Santiago de Chile after its bus liberalization in the 1990s. 
In this case, the operators had strong incentives to race on 
the road, because their revenue continued to be based on 
fare collection even after liberalization [18].  
Several studies have identified the factors that affect 
customer satisfaction of bus service quality, including 
comfort and safety [19], in addition to accessibility and 
reliability [20, 21]. Passenger satisfaction could be affected 
by the ways the services are licensed and operated. A 
recent study in Malaysia finds that the government has 
been lax in giving permits to individual bus operators, 
which leads to fierce competition among them. This 
results in low service quality, including overloading and 
delayed departure until the vehicles are full. However, the 
study finds that the lack of perceived safety on public 
buses is not attributed to the efficiency and discipline of 
the driver, but rather the lack of lighting infrastructure and 
congestion onboard [19]. 
A comprehensive review of the literature on 
commercial motor vehicles and safety finds convincing 
evidence that compensation levels and methods significantly 
influence driver behaviors [22]. Compensation generally acts 
as a pricing mechanism, but compensation’s impact on 
drivers is complex. Several theories are used to explain the 
causal relationship between compensation levels and 
drivers’ behaviors, including incentive theory, equalizing 
differences theory, efficiency wages theory, and fair wage 
theory.   
Another set of theories focuses on compensation 
methods. Several studies argue that performance-based 
payment increases productivity [23], although the context 
of implementation is crucial [24]. But in the transport 
industries, such a compensation method could increase 
safety risks. For instance, truck drivers tend to work long 
hours when the compensation is low but increases with 
number of hours, thereby inducing more safety risks [25]. 
There remains scant literature that systematically explores 
the association between compensation methods and 
service quality and safety of urban bus services.  
 
3. Bus Operation in Bangkok 
 
In general, there are currently two operational models 
of bus services in Bangkok: the state-run BMTA services 
and the “joint services” run by private operators. In order 
to understand the current competition and operational 
models, we need to trace back to the original reasons why 
the BMTA was established as the sole licensee of city bus 
operation and what factors prevent the state agency from 
providing more efficient and demand-responsive services. 
Up until the 1970s, public buses in Bangkok were 
operated by private operators. The services faced several 
problems, including bus shortage and inability to expand 
services, because of low profit margins and the 
government’s fare control. In 1971, a West German 
transportation expert proposed that the bus operations be 
unified to reduce costs and improve service quality.  
Driven partly by a campaign pledge to provide free buses, 
the government hurriedly established the state-owned bus 
monopoly, the short-lived Mahanakhon Transport Company, 
which subsequently transformed into the BMTA [26]. The 
agency was granted operating licenses of all bus routes in 
Bangkok, and inherited the bus businesses from private 
operators, including their assets and employees [2]. It was 
in effect a clear policy shift from the laissez-faire model of 
competition and operation to the natural monopoly 
model. 
Since its establishment, the state bus monopoly 
incurred huge debts from buying out previous bus 
managements. Having no resources to provide bus 
services due to slow transfer of businesses, the agency had 
to rely on the previous operators to do so. Despite the 
BMTA’s subsequent purchase of new buses, the problem 
of bus shortage persisted due to deteriorating traffic 
congestion and rapid demand growth in the ever 
expanding city. As a result, a large number of unauthorized 
private operators used songtaews (converted pick up trucks) 
to provide bus services. In 1986, the government legalized 
these operators, while mandating them to change the 
vehicles to box-type minibuses for those operating on 
main streets [2]. The traditional songtaews continue to be 
allowed to run only in sois (secondary streets and alleys). 
The operating licenses of these routes were issued to the 
BMTA, which then subcontracted them to private 
operators. 
The BMTA continued to accumulate operating 
deficit, and it was unable to respond to the burgeoning 
demand due to rapid suburbanization. With limited 
resources, the state agency could not expand services to 
cover all routes for which it was granted operating licenses. 
To circumvent the problem, beginning in 1986, the 
Department of Land Transport (DLT) invited private 
operators to operate under the BMTA’s umbrella, and 
allowed the BMTA to issue joint-service contracts with 
private operators [2]. Since then, the number of joint-
service operators has grown significantly; there are now 
more routes and vehicles operated by joint-service 
operators than the BMTA itself, as shown in Table 2. 
While the BMTA uses only full-size buses, the private 
operators use not only full-size buses, but also minibuses, 
converted pickup trucks, and passenger vans. 
The service contracts between the BMTA and private 
operators cover general service-related issues, such as bus 
routes, frequency, and payment and fees. It does not 
stipulate drivers’ working hours and conditions. Such 
issues are supposedly covered by the Transport Act, as 
revised in 1999 and in accordance with the 1998 Labor 
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Protection Act. The law stipulates that a driver cannot 
operate a public transport vehicle consecutively longer 
than four hours without resting for at least half an hour, 
and that a driver cannot work longer than eight hours in 
one working day. The DLT as the regulator of the law 
mandates that all bus operators record their drivers’ 
working hours in log books stored in the vehicles. Public 
transport operators have to ensure their drivers strictly 
follow safety regulations. Every driver has to follow public 
transport and traffic regulations, including being drug and 
alcohol free, no use of mobile phones while driving unless 
with headsets, and driving only on the left lane except 
when passing. If the drivers do not follow the rules and 
cause any accidents, the DLT could suspend or revoke the 
operators’ licenses. But in reality the DLT just occasionally 
checks the log books and rarely conducts spot inspection, 
due to limited financial and human resources.  
As for health and other benefits, only drivers officially 
employed full time by a legally registered operator with 
one or more employees are entitled to receive social 
security benefits. According to the 1999 Social Security 
Act, the coverage now includes not only sickness, 
maternity, invalidity, and death, but also child allowance, 
pension, and unemployment. The social security benefits 
do not extend to informal and temporary workers. 
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
Because no study has ever systematically examined the 
relationship between bus service quality and operational 
models and compensation methods in Bangkok, the 
primary aim of our research at this stage is to explore the 
problems in order to lay the groundwork for quantitative 
studies in the future. Even though we did not utilize 
rigorous statistical methods in this study, we collected 
both qualitative and quantitative data to test the following 
operational hypothesis:  The root cause of poor service 
quality of Bangkok’s bus services is the licensing/ 
operational model of subcontracting bus services to joint-
service private operators, whose common compensation 
methods incentivize drivers to work long hours beyond 
what is permitted by law and to compete for passengers 
on the road. This in turn affects the service quality and 
potentially safety. 
To examine this hypothesis, we selected bus routes 
with the largest number of complaints and conducted a 
structured interview survey of drivers, conductors, and 
dispatchers to obtain information about their operational 
practices and compensation methods on those routes. 
Then, we compared the compensation methods of the 
routes with the highest rates of complaints and reported 
accidents with those with the lowest rates. We categorized 
the routes into two groups: those run only by joint-service 
operators and those run only by the BMTA. 
To represent the level of bus service quality, we 
obtained the data on passenger complaints from the 1584 
Call Center, which is a DLT hotline that passengers can 
provide feedback on all bus services. The DLT hotline 
keeps a database that records complaint types, bus types, 
operator types, and route numbers. We were able to obtain 
a monthly report of the database that summarizes the bus 
routes with the five largest numbers of complaints from 
October 2016 to March 2017. The monthly data are 
compiled and sorted at the route level separately for those 
operated by the BMTA and those by joint-service 
operators. We then ranked the routes in order of number 
of complaints. As the number of complaints may depend 
on the fleet size on each route, we also normalize it by the 
number of buses for each route to better understand the 
relative frequency of complaints. 
Originally, we also hypothesized that the compensation 
methods would also have noticeable effects on bus safety, 
as some routes are notorious for reckless driving and news 
reports abound with stories of bus crashes. We thus 
obtained data on accidents from the DLT’s database of 
passenger bus accidents. But as it turned out, the number 
of accidents that occurred to BMTA and its joint-service 
buses in the study period was too small to conduct a 
systematic analysis of the eventual impact on bus safety. 
Only 24 bus accidents were reported and included in the 
official records in 2016. Official records of accidents 
include only severe crashes with serious injuries or fatality, 
most of which usually occur on intercity bus routes. Bus 
accidents in Bangkok frequently reported in the news tend 
to be of minor damages and are not included in the 
government’s database. Therefore, we were not able to 
test the relationship between operational models and bus 
safety as measured by accident numbers recorded by the 
government. 
Nevertheless, the records on passenger complaints, as 
shown in the following section, include categories that 
indicate safety concerns. One of the top complaints about 
the buses is “The bus was driven in a frightening manner.” 
While we do not know how much such a driving manner 
leads to actual accidents, we can conjecture that the 
possibility is beyond ignorable levels. 
To acquire data on drivers’ compensation methods 
and levels, we conducted a structured interview survey at 
bus depots between 14 and 25 July 2018. Among the 94 
full-size bus routes operated by joint-service operators, we 
randomly selected a total of 21 routes, including 18 routes 
with most complaints and three routes with no complaints. 
For each route, we conducted a structured interview of a 
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dispatcher and three drivers, asking about the working 
conditions, compensations, and welfare benefits of 
drivers. We chose only those that operate full-size buses, 
so that we can compare directly with the BMTA operation, 
which only has full-size buses.  
To compare between the models of private operators 
and public operators, we also collected information about 
the BMTA employee’s compensation, fringe benefits, and 
work rules. We obtained the data from official BMTA 
documents, including the official salary structure and 
hiring announcements, and also from interviews with 
BMTA employees regarding their working conditions. We 
also conducted follow-up interviews with key informants 
who are bus enthusiasts for additional information about 




5.1. Complaint Statistics 
 
As Table 3 shows, in general, the BMTA seems to 
provide better quality of service than the private operators, 
with slightly more than half of the total number of 
complaints on the private operators. The top three most 
common complaints for both types of operators are: buses 
not stopping at the designated stops, reckless driving, and 
rude behaviors of on-board staff. Curiously, the ranking 
orders are different. The top two complaints for the 
BMTA buses are that buses do not stop where they are 
supposed to, followed by dangerous driving, while the 
order is reversed for the private operators. Even though 
the statistics is not enough to test any hypothesis, we can 
conjecture that the BMTA is facing principal-agent 
problems. As their drivers receive guaranteed income and 
benefits, they do not necessarily have to pick up all 
passengers in all stops on the routes. By contrast, the 
drivers of private operators are incentivized to work 
longer hours and drive faster and recklessly, because their 
compensation is based on the working hours and trips and 
farebox revenues. This conjecture is supported by the 
empirical evidence presented in the following section. 
 




By ranking all bus routes by the number of 
complaints, we find that bus routes operated by joint-
service operators have much lower service quality than 
those operated by the BMTA. Table 4 shows that the 
numbers of complaints for routes operated by private 
operators are staggering, compared to those for the 
BMTA routes. Even after normalizing by the number of 
vehicles on each route, the numbers of complaints per 
vehicles operated by joint-service operators on the worst 
routes are still four to five times greater than those on the 
worst BMTA routes.  
 
Table 4. Routes with the Largest Number of Complaints, 
October 2016 to March 2017. 
 
 
5.2. Compensation Methods and Levels 
 
Based on the literature review, the survey results, and 
the additional follow-up interviews, we can categorize the 
compensation methods for private operators into two 
groups: basic compensation and additional incentives. 
 
5.2.1. Basic compensation 
 
Drivers of  joint-service operators receive three types 
of  basic compensation: daily allowance, farebox revenue 
sharing, and monthly salary. Although the majority of  
drivers are full-time employees of  private operators, most 
of  them are paid the daily allowance ranging between 215 
and 325 baht (USD 6-10) in addition to receiving varying 
percentages of  fare revenues. Generally, the daily 
allowance is not guaranteed, as the drivers must meet 
certain operational or fare revenue targets. For example, 
the drivers must drive at least four round trips, or the total 
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fare revenue must exceed a certain threshold, such as 6,000 
baht (USD 180) per day. So if  the traffic congestion is very 
bad or somehow there are few passengers on board, the 
drivers would have to drive more until the thresholds are 
met in order to receive the daily allowance. 
The fare revenue share is paid daily, although it is 
usually accumulated and paid on a weekly or monthly 
basis. Drivers normally make advance payment of fuel and 
other daily operating expenses, and keep proofs of 
payment for reimbursement at the end of each day. In 
practice, these expenses are paid from the farebox 
revenue. As Table 5 suggests, there are no uniform 
methods and levels of compensating the drivers. Because 
of the conditions imposed, these compensation methods 
are in effect performance-based. 
 
Table 5. Summary of Regular Compensation of Employees 
of Joint-Service Operators. 
 
 
5.2.2. Additional working incentives 
 
In addition, joint-service operators use various forms 
of  incentives to encourage drivers to increase fare 
revenues. These include incremental bonus allowances or 
incremental percentage of  revenue for meeting revenue 
thresholds. For example, an operator of  route number 203 
pays a bonus of  50 baht per trip for the fifth and 
subsequent trips of  the day. Other additional payment 
incentives are given for good attendance, early bird and 
long working day, late finisher, working on holidays, and 
annual bonus at year end or Chinese New Year, as 
summarized in Table 6.   
 




Table 7 shows examples of the payment schedules for 
incremental bonus that drivers could receive, depending 
on their farebox performance. The schedules vary across 
routes and operators. It is worth noting that this operator 
of Route 8, one of the three operators on the route, has 
one of the most generous payment schedules for 
incremental bonuses, and the route also has the largest 
number of complaints.  
 




Most drivers who are full time employees receive 
some minimum social security benefits, which entitle them 
to basic health care. Some employers also provide other 
fringe benefits, such as free or discounted 
accommodation. But we find that approximately 20% of 
them are not full-time employees, so they do not receive 
any social security benefits. 
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5.2.2.1. Working conditions: Sweatshops on wheels 
 
It is common for drivers employed by joint-service 
operators to start working before 5:00 a.m. and finish near 
midnight. The operational or fare revenue targets mean 
that drivers must work long hours to meet the income 
requirements. Due to the long working hours, it is a 
common practice for many drivers to work three 
consecutive days and take one day off. 
While the majority of drivers are full time employees 
of bus operators, we find that approximately 20% of the 
drivers rent the buses from the private joint-service 
operators. Most of these drivers are regular renters, but 
pay the rent on a daily basis. The rental cost depends on 
whether maintenance costs are included. When renters pay 
for maintenance costs, the rent is lower, around 2,800 baht 
(USD 84) per day. But if the maintenance is included, the 
rent is higher, around 3,500 baht (USD 105) per day. 
Generally, renters pay for all day-to-day operating 
expenses, such as fuel around 1,000 baht (USD 30) per 
day, tolls, and keep all the fare revenue. The average net 
daily income after operating expenses is roughly 1,000 
baht (USD 30) per bus, which is split between the driver 
and the conductor, who are often husband and wife, or 
family members. Aside from regular renters, some are 
part-time drivers, who rent buses only occasionally. 
Driver-renters do not receive any salary or welfare 
benefits, relying only on fare revenues. Nor do they have 
operational or revenue targets, and their working hours 
tend to be more flexible than those of employees. 
 
5.2.2.2. BMTA drivers’ compensation and working 
conditions 
 
As shown in Table 8, we find that the compensation 
and working conditions of  BMTA employees are much 
better than those of  joint-service operators. They receive 
monthly salary, ranging from 10,150 to 37,500 baht (USD 
305-1,124) for drivers and 9,040 to 22,500 baht (USD 271-
675) for conductors, with an additional daily allowance of  
50 baht for drivers and 20 baht for conductors [27]. They 
also receive the fare revenue share, albeit at a much lower 
rate than private operators’ employees, at 0.10 baht per 
ticket for drivers and 0.05 baht per ticket for conductors.  
Unlike joint-service operators, the BMTA strictly 
adheres to the eight-hour working-day rule, as stipulated 
by the labor law. Beyond the eight-hour limit, an overtime 
payment is made. The overtime rate, starting from 40 baht 
(USD 1.2) per hour, increases with the salary level, which 
in turn depends on the number of years of driving 
experience. Each BMTA employee receives one day off 
per week, and has a regular work schedule. They also have 
10 paid-vacation days, 30-day sick leave, and 20-day leave 
of absence. BMTA employees also receive good welfare 
and fringe benefits. Health care benefits cover not only the 
employees themselves but also their immediate family, 
including parents, spouse, and up to three children. 
Educational expenses of employees’ children are also 
covered. Finally, BMTA employees are entitled to free 
rides on all BMTA buses [28].  
With relatively good compensation, it is unsurprising 
that significantly fewer complaints on reckless driving 
behaviors are made to BMTA buses than to joint-service 
operators. However, as shown in Table 3, a large number 
of passengers complained that BMTA drivers do not stop 
to pick up passengers at designated stops. Some 
passengers complained that BMTA drivers drive too 
slowly, especially near the end of their eight-hour shift, in 
order to earn extra overtime payment [7]. 
 





Although the business models and compensation 
levels and methods vary among private operators, the 
proportions of income that their employees receive from 
fare revenue sharing are generally much larger than those 
of BMTA employees. Together with the evidence from 
the official statistics that private operators’ drivers tend to 
drive more recklessly than those of BMTA drivers, we can 
conclude that employees’ compensation methods clearly 
play an important role in influencing driving behaviors and 
service quality. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Our findings show that Bangkok’s private bus 
operators provide their drivers with less compensation 
and benefits than the state operator, and their 
compensation methods incentivize the drivers to work 
longer hours than allowed by law. The data also show that 
the routes operated by private operators receive more 
passenger complaints than those operated by the state bus 
agency. We thus conclude that the operational models and 
their specific compensation methods are associated with 
the service quality of bus services in Bangkok. We 
conjecture that the joint-service model as practiced in 
Bangkok increases on-the-road competition and decreases 
the overall service quality, as private operators adopt 
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compensation methods that incentivize their drivers to 
drive faster and work longer hours. 
While the compensation methods based on fare 
revenue may account for the poor service performance of 
private operators compared to the BMTA, they cannot 
explain the performance variation among the private 
operators. A question thus arises as to what factors may 
account for the varying service qualities among private 
operators. Although we cannot directly answer this 
question with the findings from this study, we can offer 
some insights into the issue, using information that we 
gathered from additional field observation and informal 
interviews with several stakeholders.  
An important factor that also induces racing for 
passengers is the number of overlapping services on the 
same routes. Routes with a large number of complaints, 
such as the notorious route no. 8, usually run on the 
corridors with many overlapping routes, which tend to be 
high-density corridors with substantial bus demand. Being 
the last bus that follows a platoon of other buses on the 
same route could mean ending up with a near empty fare 
box. So such a scenario must be avoided at all costs. By 
contrast, in less dense corridors with few or no 
overlapping routes, drivers have little incentive to race for 
passengers, who are usually captive. Thus, fewer 
complaints about reckless driving are filed in these routes. 
Such a routing problem not only increases on-road 
competition and reduces service quality, but also directly 
affects the city’s overall bus operation, as the overlapped 
routes increase the number of vehicles in the traffic while 
decreasing the number of operating cycles [29]. 
Ineffective regulation of joint-service operators stems 
partly from the current institutional arrangement. The 
DLT is the de jure regulator of all public bus operators, 
but with limited man power and technical resources. Since 
BMTA is a state-owned agency, it is supposed and 
expected to fully comply with the law, and the DLT 
loosely regulate bus operations by the BMTA and their 
joint-service operators. Therefore, the BMTA as the sole 
licensee of bus services in Bangkok serves as the de facto 
regulator of the private joint-service operators, not by legal 
authority, but by enforcing the subcontracts. However, the 
BMTA’s resources are spread between its dual roles, i.e., 
as the bus operator itself and as the de facto regulator of 
private operators.  The BMTA naturally focuses on the 
operator role and engages minimally in the regulatory role 
just enough to collect the joint-service fees. In addition, 
the government’s tight control of fare does not reflect the 
true operating costs, so the private operators have to 
reduce costs by cutting corners. The DLT and the BMTA 
are thus hesitant to demand significant service 
improvement from the private operators, given the 
unrealistically low fare. 
To enhance service quality and safety, regulators often 
place pressure on operators and drivers without 
addressing underlying causes. We believe that policy 
changes are direly needed that address drivers’ 
compensation methods and levels, in addition to 
regulating and enforcing working hours and labor 
conditions. As far as we know, transport agencies rarely 
work with labor agencies. So intergovernmental cooperation 
between the two line agencies should also be encouraged 
so that compensation and working conditions of transport 
workers are improved. At the same time, the ongoing 
problems in fare regulation need to be addressed. 
Currently, the government can interfere with fare setting, 
as the regulatory board is filled with many members 
directly appointed by the Minister of Transport. Fearing a 
public backlash, the board rarely approves a fare hike. But 
with limited subsidies, both public and private operators 
cannot modernize their fleets, not to mention to improve 
their drivers’ compensation levels and methods.  
As of December 2020, the Thai Cabinet has approved 
a BMTA rehabilitation plan, which includes a proposal for 
the government to shoulder the BMTA’s debt of more 
than 120 billion baht (USD 4 billion). Another key 
component of the plan is to hire private companies to 
procure and operate more than 2,000 electric air-
conditioned buses. The plan will also introduce a daily 
ticket priced at 30 baht for unlimited trips so as to help 
lower the commuting cost. It still remains to be seen 
whether these initiatives will be implemented and 
eventually lead to better overall service quality.  
One key limitation of this research is the types and 
sizes of data sets used in the analysis. Future research 
could benefit from data collection methods that would 
allow for statistically rigorous analyses, including a 
questionnaire survey on rider perception and satisfaction. 
Future studies could also examine the grave financial 
conditions of the BMTA and most, if not all, private 
operators, as they greatly determine the current and future 
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